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Abstract 
The majority of trust research has focused on the benefits trust can have for individual actors, 
institutions, and organizations. This “optimistic bias” is particularly evident in work focused on 
institutional trust, where concepts such as procedural justice, shared values, and moral 
responsibility have gained prominence. But trust in institutions may not be exclusively good. We 
reveal implications for the “dark side” of institutional trust by reviewing relevant theories and 
empirical research that can contribute to a more holistic understanding. We frame our discussion 
by suggesting there may be a “Goldilocks principle” of institutional trust, where trust that is too 
low (typically the focus) or too high (not usually considered by trust researchers) may be 
problematic. The chapter focuses on the issue of too-high trust and processes through which such 
too-high trust might emerge. Specifically, excessive trust might result from external, internal, 
and intersecting external-internal processes. External processes refer to the actions institutions 
take that affect public trust, while internal processes refer to intrapersonal factors affecting a 
trustor’s level of trust. We describe how the beneficial psychological and behavioral outcomes of 
trust can be mitigated or circumvented through these processes and highlight the implications of 
a “darkest” side of trust when they intersect. We draw upon research on organizations and legal, 
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governmental, and political systems to demonstrate the dark side of trust in different contexts. 
The conclusion outlines directions for future research and encourages researchers to consider the 
ethical nuances of studying how to increase institutional trust. 
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This chapter focuses on an issue that is often overlooked in the broad field of trust 
scholarship. The issue is that discussions about and studies of trust typically focus on the positive 
aspects of trust – how trust improves relationships, encourages good behavior, improves business 
outcomes, and so forth (Gargiulo & Ertug, 2006). This “optimistic bias” is particularly evident in 
work focused on trust in institutions, where concepts such as procedural justice, shared values, 
and moral responsibility have gained prominence.1 Consider, for example, the content included 
in the 62nd Annual Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, Cooperation and Compliance with 
Authority: The Role of Institutional Trust, its accompanying volume (Bornstein & Tomkins, 
2015), and the associated National Science Foundation Workshop on Institutional Trust and 
Confidence (the basis of the current volume). Clearly, the “bright side” of trust in institutional 
contexts is highly appreciated.  
However, trust can also have undesired consequences under some circumstances, 
suggesting that trust in institutions is not universally good. For example, MacCoun (2005) 
asserted that the body of work on procedural justice – ways in which public institutions such as 
police and the courts can behave to improve public cooperation and compliance – has troubling 
implications for leaving people susceptible to manipulation and exploitation. Likewise, Zahra, 
Yavuz, and Ucbasaran (2006) discussed the dysfunctional effects of trust on new business-
creation incentives, such as overreliance on trust in interpersonal relationships leading to poor 
business decisions. Further, Skinner, Dietz, and Weibel (2014) discussed how trust can be 
problematic in organizational settings, such as by incurring unwelcome obligations to 
reciprocate.  
Villena, Revilla, and Choi (2011) found evidence for “dark side” as well as a “bright 
side” of social capital2 for buyer-supplier relationships in management contexts. Specifically, 
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their results showed an inverted curvilinear relationship between social capital and performance, 
such that too little and too much social capital hurt performance. Thus, building trust and social 
capital is a good thing – up to a point. Like the children’s story “The Three Bears” in which the 
protagonist Goldilocks determines that various things between two extremes are “just right,” 
there may be an optimal level of trust for people to have in institutions. Although problems 
associated with too-low institutional trust are commonly discussed (e.g., Warren, 1999; Newton, 
2001), there may also be detrimental consequences to consider for institutional trust that is 
uncalibrated in the “too high” direction.  
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the potentially negative implications of too-
high trust in the context of institutions and organizations. Specifically, trust is not beneficial for 
trustees when a trusted institution actually behaves in untrustworthy ways. Our conceptual 
overview is organized through an analysis of processes contributing to the negative implications 
of trust, including external processes, internal processes, and their intersection. The unjustified 
high public trust might be due to actions taken by the institution (i.e., external-to-the-individual, 
or trustee-related, processes) to boost individuals’ trust in it, such as public relations campaigns 
or efforts to increase public participation and perceived voice or control without a genuine 
reflection of the institutions’ trustworthiness. Conversely, unjustified high trust might be due to 
intraindividual processes (i.e., trustor-related processes)– features of the trustor that encourage 
them to place greater-than-warranted trust in the institution, such as a heightened motivation to 
believe that one’s public institutions deserve to be trusted without evidence that an increase is 
such trust is rational. 
“External” and “Internal” Processes 
A person’s trust in an institution can involve both “external” and “internal” processes. 
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That is, the institution can take actions to encourage the person’s trust (external process), or a 
person can experience or engage in intrapsychic processes that adjust their level of institutional 
trust (internal process). The boost in institutional trust resulting from these mechanisms may be 
considered beneficial as trust in institutions often has desirable consequences for individuals and 
institutions alike (e.g., Newton, 2001; Warren, 1999). However, when trust is uncalibrated to the 
context and people trust an institution too much, negative consequences may emerge. For 
instance, when people’s trust is high, they are less likely to think critically, less likely to question 
assumptions, and are more susceptible to the “halo effect” and stereotyping (e.g., Mayo, 2014; 
Posten & Mussweiler, 2013).  
External Processes 
Institutions may be motivated to increase public trust in order to benefit from the positive 
consequences of public trust. For example, institutions enjoy less monitoring and vigilant 
attention to their activities when public trust is high, as well as higher commitment and lower 
conflict compared to institutions with low public trust (Gargiulo & Ertug, 2006). Institutions 
with high public trust are also more likely to elicit increased cooperation and compliance – 
surely benefits institutions seek (e.g., Das & Teng, 1998; Siegrist, Earle & Gutscher, 2003).  
Given such benefits, it is probably no surprise that institutions do seek to enhance public 
trust. Take, for example, the Obama Administration’s Open Government Initiative, an 
undertaking designed explicitly to “ensure the public trust” (Obama, 2009, para. 1). Or the 
National Center for State Courts’ (2000) action plan to “build public trust and confidence” in the 
courts (p. 6). A search for enhancing public trust on Google’s web search engine reveals a half 
billion results. Many of these results discuss the importance of and strategies for increasing the 
public’s trust with regard to institutions as varied as the healthcare system, agriculture, banks, the 
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food safety regulatory system, police, non-profits, and the accounting profession.  
Institutions can earn the public’s trust by demonstrating substantively trustworthy 
behavior – for example, by competently doing their job, treating people fairly and with respect, 
and being open about their operations. When people’s trust in institutions is based on 
demonstrable evidence of trustworthiness, the public trust may be well-calibrated to the actual 
trustworthiness of the institution. But institutions also can encourage public trust through non-
substantive means. For example, they can provide heuristic cues of trustworthiness – implicit 
cues that quickly and automatically generate trust (e.g., Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1984). When a person’s trust in an institution is based on heuristic credibility cues 
rather than substantive information, the level of trust may or may not be calibrated to the actual 
trustworthiness of the institution.  
Examples of the effectiveness of heuristic cues include Gibson, Lodge, and Woodson’s 
(2014) demonstration that exposure to the symbols of judicial authority (justices in black robes, a 
temple-like building, a gavel) compared to abstract symbols that somewhat mimicked the 
judicial symbols in shape and form (black lines, image of white marble, wooden surface) 
bolstered institutional support, perceptions of legitimacy, and acquiescence to court rulings with 
which people disagreed. Similarly, Hassin, Ferguson, Shidlovski, and Gross (2007) found that 
Israelis’ exposure to their flag – a symbol for many of nationality, centrism, and cooperation – 
increased bipartisan support for key political issues, voting intentions, and actual voting behavior 
in a national election. Relatedly, subtle exposure to the United States’ flag – which is associated 
more with the Republican than Democratic Party in Americans’ minds – appears to increase 
support for Republican candidates (Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin, 2011). Also studying the role of 
heuristic processes, Sah, Moore, and MacCoun (2013) showed that people used an advisor’s 
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confidence as a heuristic cue to judge his or her credibility and trustworthiness; more confident 
advisors were perceived as more credible. Furthermore, when substantive information about the 
advisors’ errors was available but hard or expensive to access, people made less of an effort to 
determine the accuracy of confident advisors than they did for unconfident advisors. These 
results reveal ways in which people’s trust in institutions could be susceptible to external 
manipulation. 
Internal Processes 
Various internal cognitive, affective, and motivational processes also influence people’s 
institutional trust. Such processes appear to involve generalizable properties of human 
psychology and they also involve individual differences in trustors, in that their reasoning and 
assimilation of information may be biased by their preexisting preferences or attitudes (e.g., 
Kunda 1990; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). For instance, MacCoun and Paletz (2009) showed 
that citizens were more skeptical of the findings of a hypothetical scientific study when the 
findings contradicted their prior beliefs about the topic.  
Cultural cognition theory sheds further light on intraindividual characteristics that impact 
people’s trust in institutions, as it postulates that heuristic mechanisms or “mental shortcuts” 
people use to make rapid judgments interact with cultural values (e.g., Kahan, Braman, Cohen, 
Gastil, & Slovic, 2010). That is, due to the cultural “glasses” through which people view the 
world, people pay attention to, attribute value to, remember, and evaluate information 
differently. Such cultural views include preferences about how society should be organized (such 
as egalitarian vs. hierarchist, individualist vs. communitarian preferences). The cultural cognition 
framework demonstrates how the same information, when processed through the same heuristic 
processes (such as credibility cues, availability and representativeness, status-quo bias, loss 
9 
 
aversion, emotion, and so forth), can generate different judgments in people with opposing 
worldviews. Thus, people may be motivated to trust certain institutions or institutional 
representatives that fit their cultural worldviews, and rely on the “internal” mechanisms of 
cultural cognition to find reasons to support their desire to trust the institutions.  
People can also benefit psychologically from feeling they can trust public institutions. A 
robust body of literature demonstrates that people are motivated to palliate perceived threats to 
safety, security, and a sense of meaning and understanding (see Shockley & Shepherd, this 
volume, for considerable detail on this topic). These psychological motivations may lead people 
to increase their trust in institutions, independent of the actions of the institutions, in order to 
restore a comfortable psychological state. Thus, motivational processes internal to the trustor can 
generate unearned institutional trust. This is a process called compensatory institutional trust 
(see Shockley & Shepherd, this volume). In a recent study, Schilke, Reimann, and Cook (2015) 
showed that such motivated cognition is particularly pronounced and leads to heightened trust 
when the trustor has relatively low (as opposed to high) structural power, with stark power-
differences being characteristic of the public’s trust in institutional authorities. This finding 
suggests that excessive trust may be especially common when the trusting individual is highly 
dependent on a powerful institution. 
The “Darkest Side”: When “External” and “Internal” Processes Intersect 
External and internal processes also might intersect in ways that reveal implications for 
the “darkest side” of institutional trust. Specifically, when institutions know about the internal 
susceptibilities and vulnerabilities of trustors, and when they are in a position to leverage 
mechanisms through which high trust can be generated, institutions might take advantage of that 
knowledge to orchestrate and manipulate an increase in trust to motivate compliance and reap 
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other benefits of high public trust. 
Let’s explore how this might occur, returning to some of the illustrations provided above. 
Gibson et al. (2014) found that exposure to the trappings of judicial authority increases 
perceptions of legitimacy and acquiescence to disagreeable rulings. Although the Supreme 
Court’s opinions often reflect public opinion (Friedman, 2009; Mishler & Sheehan, 1993), the 
Justices may at times make decisions based on their individual ideologies (Collins, & Cooper, 
2014). If the Justices decide a case in such a way as to make new public policy that is not 
supported by most of the public (especially if the legal interpretation and justification are not 
terribly compelling), and if they know that demonstrating symbols of their authority make people 
more accepting of the Court’s power and legitimacy, the justice(s) might purposely highlight the 
physical and symbolic trappings of their judicial authority when communicating their decision in 
order to boost perceptions of legitimacy and temper public protest. 
As a second example, suppose a candidate from the Republican Party is trailing in 
projected election polls and knows the literature suggesting that exposing United States citizens 
to the American flag affects their voting behavior and increases support for Republican 
candidates (Carter et al., 2011). The candidate could, in an attempt to boost the chance of 
winning the election, alter her/his campaign materials and advertisements to include more 
images of the national flag. This candidate would be capitalizing on exposure to the flag and 
“internal” heuristic processing mechanisms through the strategic use of symbols (i.e., images of 
the flag) to make conservative values salient and accessible and thus more likely to influence 
people’s judgments and perceptions (e.g., Salancik & Conway, 1975). 
As a couple of final examples, institutional elites might be aware that people are 
motivated to trust in and defer to the decisions of the institution especially when tasks or issues 
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are complex and difficult for people to understand (Shepherd & Kay, 2012). The institution 
might leverage this knowledge to purposely make issues seem very complex, such as using 
highly complicated language or even “legalese” so that the public disengages from participating 
and frees the institution to decide how to handle the issue on its own. Or perhaps knowing that 
displays of confidence increase trust and reduce people’s motivation to look for disconfirming 
evidence (e.g., Sah et al., 2013), institutions might intentionally act confident, even when they 
are not, in order to “mask” potential problems within the institution. Finally, communicating and 
emphasizing how dependent the public is on an institution may lead people to engage in greater 
motivated reasoning, and in turn, to place excessive trust the institution (Schilke, Reimann, & 
Cook, 2015). These examples might reflect (perhaps common) manifestations of the “darkest 
side” of institutional trust. Figure 10.1 summarizes the external, internal, and intersecting 
processes driving too-high trust that are discussed in this chapter. 
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Context-Specific Applications of the “Dark Side” of Institutional Trust 
 In this section, we offer context-specific examples of external, internal, and intersecting 
processes of the dark side of institutional trust. We do so by drawing upon research on 
organizations and legal, governmental, and political systems.  
Organizations 
 Scholarly research on the role of trust in organizational contexts has proliferated 
substantially in recent years (Cook & Schilke, 2010; Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012). Many 
organizational systems are characterized by high levels of uncertainty, and it is under high 
uncertainty when trust becomes an important issue (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). 
Organizations are trusted by various stakeholder groups (Pirson & Malhotra, 2011)—most 
notably employees, customers, suppliers, alliance partners, and investors. These trustors rely on a 
variety of cues in determining the trustworthiness of an organization (Schilke & Cook, 2015). 
While making trust judgments, external and internal processes as well as their intersection can be 
responsible for too much trust being placed in organizations. 
 External processes. There are several examples of organizations that produced excessive 
levels of trust through selective communication, but the Enron Corporation – the now-bankrupt 
major American energy company – is probably the most prominent one. As Currall and Epstein’s 
(2003) case study makes clear, Enron strategically manufactured an image of a super-trustworthy 
firm. While aggressively communicating academic credentials and philanthropic activities of 
their top management team, along with the innovativeness of their business model and the track 
record of their ever-increasing stock price, Enron withheld information on many of its business 
practices so that outsiders did not have full information on the firm’s operations (Mardjono, 
2005; Sridharan, Caines, McMillan, & Summers, 2002). This lack of disclosure and transparency 
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successfully masked the company’s actual performance and held trust high. 
 Another prominent situation in which organizations disclose positive signals while 
holding back negative information is during mergers and acquisitions. This practice is called 
“window dressing.” Although investors tend to be aware of window dressing activities being the 
norm rather the exception, it can nonetheless lead to significant problems in that the buying firm 
places too much trust in the economic health of the target firm. One such situation was when the 
AT&T Corporation, a major American telecommunications company, acquired the NCR 
Corporation, an American computer hardware, software, and electronics company. AT&T’s 
value-destroying acquisition of NCR in the early 1990s is frequently attributed to AT&T falling 
victim to significant intransparencies (Lys & Vincent, 1995). 
 Internal processes. The Enron case mentioned earlier can also be used to illustrate a key 
internal process of the dark side of trust: people’s susceptibility to social influence when making 
trust judgments (Currall & Epstein, 2003). Especially on Wall Street, investment firm analysts 
fell victim to normative perceptions when assessing Enron. If so many other analysts issue a 
“buy” recommendation, what could possibly be wrong with Enron? Given that Enron seemed to 
be everybody’s darling, it became increasingly difficult for individual analysts to make the case 
against Enron’s trustworthiness.  
 Another internal process responsible for excessive levels of trust in organizations is 
related to status quo bias, or a preference for and acceptance of the current state of affairs 
(Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). Especially in long-term relationships with an 
organization, people may develop a tendency to scrutinize their trust perceptions of that 
organization to a far lesser extent (Grayson & Ambler, 1999). In other words, people may over 
time become lazy and place unwarranted trust in the organization. This claim is supported by 
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recent research in decision neuroscience that finds cognitive resources devoted to trust judgments 
to decline with increasing relationship length, with trust being maintained even under 
circumstances when trust is clearly violated (Schilke, Reimann, & Cook, 2013). This might be 
explained by the lack of clarity in a trust violation. Even if a breach of trust by an organization is 
suspected, it is often very difficult to prove (Anderson & Jap, 2005). For example, are delivery 
problems really the fault of the organization or are those problems beyond that organization’s 
control? The difficulties and significant effort involved in identifying and proving untrustworthy 
behavior of an organization may lead trustors to neglect or even deny any problems. 
 Intersecting processes. A Ponzi scheme – a fraudulent investment operation in which 
the investments of later investors are used to pay “returns” to earlier investors – exemplifies a 
manifestation of the darkest side of trust where external and internal processes intersect. 
Organizations involved in Ponzi schemes strategically manipulate how people make sense of the 
situation and assign trust. Bernard Madoff’s $65 billion Ponzi scheme stands out not just in terms 
of its magnitude but also in terms of its sophistication of trust manipulation (Kramer, 2009). 
Madoff was a master at managing social connections; once he had his foot in the door with one 
investor in a particular community, he made sure that this investor’s contacts were made aware 
of the investment opportunity so that social influence processes could kick in. Another internal 
process that Ponzi scheme operators frequently leverage is unrealistic optimism. It is well known 
that people often overestimate the likelihood of positive things happening to them (e.g., 
Weinstein, 1980), even if deep down they are fully aware that certain things seem too good to be 
true. Ponzi schemes cater to this illusion by secretly using investments of late investors for 
paying earlier investors instead of legitimate investment returns. In so doing, the schemes’ 
operators solicit trust and encourage higher risk-taking through the illusion that investing is 
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genuinely lucrative. 
Legal, Governmental, and Political systems 
 Here we focus on examples of external, internal, and interactive processes that lend 
themselves toward the “dark side” of too-high trust in legal, governmental, and political 
institutions. 
External processes. Shockley and Fairdosi (2015) present the problem of democracy 
failing to deliver on its promises. In theory, democracy functions as a system in which citizens’ 
equal participation in the legislative process is normatively prescribed. This view of democracy 
relies upon the ability of these citizens to gain an informed understanding about policies (Dahl, 
1998). Direct democracy, contrasted with representative democracy in which citizens self-govern 
indirectly through elected representatives, involves a transfer of power away from elites and 
toward citizens. It has long been theorized that this highly participatory style of democracy 
would, if implemented, lead to the citizenry being more engaged, informed, and efficacious 
(Barnett, 1915; Bryce, 1910; Cree, 1892; Garner, 1907; Haynes, 1907; Key & Crouch, 1939; 
Munro, 1912; Sullivan, 1892). 
Shockley and Fairdosi (2015) detail research revealing disappointingly low levels of 
participation of American citizens in direct democracy compared with candidate elections 
(Cronin, 1989; Dubois & Feeney, 1998; Everson, 1981). These consequences may result from 
the complex language that characterizes ballot initiatives and policy descriptions (Dubois & 
Feeney, 1998; Magleby, 1984). Indeed, issues put to a popular vote are often written as 
complicated legislative proposals with technical language. Even official descriptions of 
upcoming ballot initiatives can be excessively complexly worded (LaPalombara, 1950; Magleby, 
1984). Furthermore, longer ballots are thought to encourage abstention (Cronin, 1989; Darcy & 
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Schneider, 1989; Dubin & Kalsow, 1994; Dubois & Feeney, 1998; Magleby, 1984). 
Inaccessible language can be deliberately used in proposed statutes, charter or 
constitutional amendments, and local ordinances as well as in their descriptions mailed to 
citizens. A choice to use complex language in this way might be made in order to increase 
abstention should that serve elites’ agendas. To the extent that participatory democracy is 
prescribed within a governmental and political context, this is a dark side of institutional trust 
undermining participation. Specifically, we theorize that ballot initiative complexity increases 
institutional trust among a citizenry that may not trust itself to self-govern.  
 Internal processes. What role do internal processes play in generating too-high trust in 
legal, governmental, and political systems? One such process is the intraindividual experience 
associated with encountering a complex policy or social issue. This experience may lead to 
confusion and, in turn, compensatory institutional trust (Shockley & Shepherd, this volume). 
Indeed, in terms of the aforementioned context of direct democracy, American citizens report 
high levels of confusion (Bowler & Donovan, 1998; Cronin, 1989; Dubois & Feeney, 1998).  
 Supporting such a notion, Shepherd and Kay (2012) found that exposure to a 
sociopolitical issue described in complex language induces confusion regarding the issue. In 
turn, this confusion appears to lead individuals to perceive low personal control, feel dependent 
upon a relevant institution, have greater trust in the institution to manage the issue, and avoid 
further information about the issue. Furthermore, avoidance of information renders individuals 
less capable of effectively participating in democratic decision-making regarding the issue in the 
future, and may impact participation in social movements and challenges to the status quo more 
generally. When people read about a policy in confusing language, they may feel insufficiently 
competent to understand and participate effectively in politics (Bowler & Donovan, 2002; Smith 
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& Tolbert, 2004) and may resolve this low sense of personal control by trusting that institutional 
elites have a handle on policy issues. Via internal processes, citizens who do not trust themselves 
appear motivated to trust in institutions instead, functionally outsourcing political engagement to 
trusted institutions and their elites. Indeed, Shockley and Fairdosi (2015) found support for these 
notions. In their experimental research, participants who were randomly assigned to read about 
an ostensible ballot initiative in complex (rather than simple) language reported a lower 
likelihood of voting on the policy as well as higher trust in the agencies involved in crafting the 
legislation. 
 Another internal process impacting institutional trust is the way in which the “pageantry” 
of symbols of judicial authority – including gavels and robes – encourages citizens to accept 
judicial decisions (Gibson et al., 2014, p. 838). The internal portion of this process is enabled by 
cognitive and affective associations (Lodge & Taber, 2000) between judicial symbols and 
legitimacy among individuals who associate judicial symbols with the positive characteristic of 
legitimacy. Mental activation of individuals’ cognitive and affective (psychological) associations 
between the courts and legitimacy and of the legitimacy-acquiescence link (i.e., that perceived 
legitimacy facilitates the acceptance of judicial decisions with which ones disagrees; Tyler, 
2006) via judicial symbols may lead individuals to be more accepting of judicial decisions and 
more obedient. 
Intersecting processes. Importantly, internal processes that generate greater institutional 
trust or perceived legitimacy can be capitalized upon by institutions. Institutional elites may not 
only capitalize upon processes that generate greater institutional trust among citizens – such as 
compensatory trust or the legitimacy and acquiescence-boosting effects of judicial symbols – but 
may additionally catalyze or enhance these processes through orchestrated manipulations of the 
18 
 
processes internal to citizens. For instance, the Supreme Court could manipulate the public’s 
attitudes in a way that enhances a positive association between exposure to judicial symbols and 
acquiescence to the Court’s decisions. We will illustrate with such an example. 
Gibson et al. (2014) found that experimentally manipulated exposure to judicial symbols 
only boosted acquiescence to a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States among 
individuals relatively supportive of the Court. This finding is consistent with the aforementioned 
framework of Lodge and Taber (2000) because it is among these individuals with positive 
attitudes toward the Court that judicial symbols are associated with the positive characteristic of 
legitimacy. Among such citizens, mental activation of the cognitive and affective association 
between the courts and legitimacy should increase the likelihood of accepting the Court’s 
decisions. Within this framework, it is also the case that individuals who are generally less 
supportive of the Court should experience a reduced likelihood of acquiescence to the Court’s 
decisions when exposed to judicial symbols due to the negative valence of their associations. 
This is essentially what Gibson et al. also found. What, then, are the implications for the 
intersection of internal and external processes of the dark sides of trust? 
 Imagine that the Supreme Court generates higher support among the citizenry and then 
capitalizes upon the fact that individuals high in support for the Court are more likely to accept 
its decisions when exposed to judicial symbols. This ultimately should maximize rates of 
acquiescence following exposure to the pageantry of judicial authority, such as the symbolism of 
judges’ robes. Thus, this would reflect a dark side of trust at the intersection of the types of 
internal and external processes we have discussed. How might the Court generate higher support 
among citizens in order to achieve especially high rates of acquiescence? Judges framing 
decisions as principled – as opposed to political – leads to increases in citizens’ perceptions of 
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judicial legitimacy (Gibson & Caldeira, 2011). Thus, portraying judicial decisions as principled – 
even if they are to some extent political – might boost support for the Court in such a way that 
exposure to judicial symbols results in even greater acquiescence among citizens to the Court’s 
decisions. 
Future Directions and Conclusions 
There is no shortage of potential future directions regarding the dark sides of institutional 
trust. The theoretical and empirical literatures suggest that both context-specific lines of inquiry 
and research into cross-cutting issues related to the dark side of institutional trust will be 
generative. To what degree do institutions intentionally and manipulatively boost perceptions of 
trust in order to benefit from high public trust?  Gargiulo and Ertug (2006) suggest institutions 
may be motivated to increase public trust in order to reduce monitoring and vigilance about their 
activities, increase public commitment, and reduce conflict regarding their missions and 
activities. Might the goal of increasing public compliance and cooperation with institutional 
preferences also motivate institutions to boost public trust?  What are the ethical implications of 
studying how institutions can improve public trust?   
A better understanding of the reach of trust generated from intraindividual motivational, 
cognitive, and attitudinal processes is also essential for appreciating the dark side of trust in 
institutional contexts. For instance, do judicial symbols like robes impact trust in non-judicial – 
but institutionally relevant – entities? Can judicial symbols impact trust toward law enforcement 
because of the cognitive connections between courts and the police? With regard to the 
motivation to trust institutions when feeling low in comprehension of sociopolitical issues, might 
we see boosts in trust of superordinate institutions? For instance, can direct democracy ballot 
initiatives at the state level (i.e., in one of the United States) that are characterized by 
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incomprehensible language not only motivate greater trust in state legislators, but also the state 
government more generally, other branches of state government, or even components of the 
federal government? Relatedly, could exposure to complex or incomprehensible policies 
motivate greater trust in candidates with specific traits during candidate elections? Perhaps a low 
sense of understanding sociopolitical issues may motivate greater trust in candidates with an 
autocratic leadership style. After all, feeling that one lacks the understanding necessary to 
effectively participate in policy decisions may lead one to see candidates with autocratic rather 
than more democratic leadership styles as more competent and thus trustworthy. 
Thus, we end this chapter with a call for more empirical research on the issue of how too 
much trust in institutions can be problematic. We also encourage scholars studying trust and 
related constructs, as well as institutions interested in increasing their perceived trust to think 
about the ethical nuances of increasing trust. As per the Goldilocks principle, there may just be 
an optimal “middle ground” for institutional trust, toward which understanding would be a 
worthwhile goal.  
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Figure Caption 
 Figure 10.1. Framework of external, internal, and intersecting processes driving too-high 
trust. 
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Notes 
                                                     
1 See PytlikZillig and Kimbrough (this volume), for a detailed discussion of the definition of 
trust and institutional trust. For the purposes of the current chapter, we use their definition, which 
(paraphrased) is as follows: institutional trust involves an interdependent trustor (e.g., citizen) 
and trustee (e.g., government branch, agency, institution) in a context that contains risk for the 
trustor. Trust is experienced by the trustor as voluntary and involves evaluations and/or 
expectations that the trustor has of the trustee. 
2 Trust is often considered a central dimension of social capital as trust facilitates leveraging the 
value of network relationships (Kemper, Schilke, & Brettel, 2013).  
